This paper seeks to advance the so-called rising powers debate of the past fifteen years by interrogating its selective use of the past. Key to the debate are the impact of rising powers like China on the international order, and how to accommodate them. Historiography plays a crucial but unappreciated role in the debate, as scholars look to the past to make sense of the future.
The phenomenon of rising powers has been one of the central themes in the past fifteen years of international relations, be it the actual practice or its academic study (IR) . Consider the spectacular success of the concept of the 'BRICs.' Coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs executive, Brazil, Russia, India and China themselves adopted it as their collective selfidentification after 2006. Academics arrived last to the feast, for instance founding a Cambridge-based Centre for Rising Powers in 2011 dedicated to studying the BRICs.
1 This is not to say they had been sitting still in the meantime: especially in the United States and China, the first decade of the new millennium saw the rise of a great debate on the rise of China in particular, its effect on US dominance, and whether it meant the US itself was in fact in decline. 2 One of the central questions posed by the academics, the investors, and indeed the emergent powers themselves is whether newly rising great powers are a threat to world order.
That is why Jim O'Neill, the banker behind BRICs, thought including them in the G7 was necessary; why Beijing insists its policy is 'peaceful rise'; and why possible US-Chinese conflict looms so large in the debate in those countries. 3 It is not the first time that rising powers have caused such debate. The debate about
China is in many ways the spitting image of that about Japan in the 1970s and eighties, including the worries about world order upheaval and great power conflict. And just like with Japan, scholars look to history for answers to their questions. They even prefer the same historical analogy for Washington's dilemmas today: Britain's in the first half of the twentieth century.
So we find that relative to the United States, China is in the same position that Washington itself was in vis-à-vis Britain until 1945, and that the strategic dilemma the US faces today is very akin to the one Germany created for Britain leading up the First World War. 4 In other words, the idea is once more that we find ourselves on the threshold of a power transition: the decline of a dominant state met with the rise of a challenger. 5 Will China be a new US, Washington a new London, and the transition a peaceful succession? Or will Beijing be a new Berlin, destabilizing world order and risking great power war? The IR theory of power transitions would certainly answer pessimistically. Power transition theorists see in these shifts moments of grave and imminent danger to international order that lead to instability or even general war. Such dislocation in turn produces a general reordering of the international system, with a new hierarchy of power and new institutions.
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I seek here to contribute to the rising power debate not by charting the future, but by interrogating its view of the past. I focus on the Anglo-American transition of power, if only because Germany never overtook Britain as a global power. The United States did. It is worth underlining this easily forgotten point. This is because, as I show below, the dominant view of the transition among both IR scholars and historians is profoundly declinist, imagining a decrepit Britain in permanent descent from the Victorian period onward. Yet as a growing revisionist literature shows, Britain remained much stronger for much longer in the twentieth century than we are used to thinking. Taking this new historiography on board profoundly changes the picture of the Anglo-American transition, with significant conclusions for the current rising powers debate.
In addition, from a theoretical point of view the Anglo-American transition is profoundly puzzling. It was accompanied by remarkable peace and continuity, not upheaval or massive conflict. Not only did the United States succeed Britain as the supreme liberal-capitalist power; it projected its power along an arc across Eurasia that had long been the "great geopolitical faultline" of British strategy too. Donald Cameron Watt called it "the replacement of Britain by the United States as the major universal power on the periphery" of Eurasia. 7 As a result, the Anglo-American case has been crucial to theories of peaceful power transitions.
Yet these theorists rely on declinist historiography as well, assuming the transition happened much earlier than revisionist historians would imply. As I argue in the essay's third section, this forces them into a 'most-likely' case study setup, when they could be testing their argument on a much harder case later in the century. Gilpin when he wrote of an interwar "interregnum" in the interwar period between British and US hegemony. 13 All of these approaches make the crucial contribution of putting contemporary US power in its greater historical and international context. Yet in so doing they make use of a long chronology of the Anglo-American transition that recent historical scholarship has undermined.
The next section takes a closer look at this chronology, which depicts the US's eclipse of Britain as a long-term, macro-historical process. I submit that it lends itself well to teleology. The transition's outcome-US superpower-appears inevitable in many accounts. Gilpin's 'interregnum,' derived from the language of royal succession, is exemplary of this, compressing the crucial period leading up to the transition into little more than an interlude. The Victorian comparison in the American empire debate likewise discounts the intervening interwar period, and is akin to Whig history, as I discuss below. This is not to say that taking a longue durée view necessarily involves a teleological claim-many macro-histories include contingency in their accounts of grand historical processes. 14 However, it is to insist that the declinism of the long chronology involves Whig history, if in reverse. Though this does not make all macrohistory Whiggish, it does not necessarily lead to the right questions or identify the key causes of how the US came to eclipse the British Empire. This paper follows a very different approach. It offers a re-periodisation of the transition to arrive at a short chronology in which the US's eclipse of Britain was an abrupt shift, not a prolonged interregnum. Suggestively, the historian John Darwin has compared this shift to the end of the Cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, equally rapid and unexpected. 15 The analysis I propose centres on precisely those factors most stressed by a contemporary like Macmillan: agency and contingency. Re-periodisation thus goes hand in hand with reconceptualisation.
To arrive at this argument I make several moves, detailed in the second section. First and foremost, the essay connects the rising powers debate to a strong attack by historians of In the rising powers and power transition debates, competing theories rely extensively on declinist historiography, which periodises the Anglo-American case according to a longterm timescale and its associated dates and key events (the stuff of chronology). I call this the 'long chronology.' The long chronology places the transition in the early twentieth century.
With some simplification, there are two variations on the theme, corresponding to two different proposed moments of transition. Britain's decline and the United States' rise are dated either to around 1900, or to 1918 and the aftermath of World War I. The supposed interregnum that followed is a derivative of the last dating.
Each of these periodisations privileges a distinct causal force, each focusing primarily on British decline. The 1900 dating emphasizes long-term productive-economic processes.
Distilled to its essentials, between 1890 and 1900 Britain lost the manufacturing primacy it had gained in the Industrial Revolution to the US and Germany, and so entered a long, painful The earliest proposed periodisation of British decline flows from "a search for [its] 'root causes'," as Keith Neilson put it. 19 The fundamental argument underlying the 1900 dating is clear and macroeconomic. In the two decades surrounding the fin de siècle, the long-time nineteenth-century primacy Britain had enjoyed in gross national product came to an end, as the country's economy was surpassed in productivity by first the United States and then Germany. It never recovered its productive primacy, and so, goes the claim, started the long slide from its onetime Victorian height to the much humbler status of just another middling power later in the twentieth century. This manufactures-based argument is often linked to the view that Britain missed the boat, as it were, of the Second Industrial Revolution, coming to lag behind its German and US rivals technologically. 20 Thus one can find proponents interpreting British colonial expansion as the reactive and defensive policy of a declining power, rather than a dominant one; its settling of outstanding differences with the United States in the Western
Hemisphere as appeasement, not rapprochement; and its joining the anti-German Entente as retrenchment instead of forward policy. 21 To cite two evocative headings, around 1900 the British Empire became a "weary titan" whose fate was to await the "coming of a bipolar world." 22 The latter showcases how far the longue durée can stretch. It directly links the loss of Britain's productive primacy around 1900 to the rise of the protagonists of the Cold War half a century later. In other words, it reduces the first half of the twentieth century to a coda of structural economic changes that occurred at the century's outset.
The First World War periodisation of British decline is based on a less straightforward and parsimonious argument. Rather than compare the national economic bases of great powers, the second variation on the long chronology looks at changes in the international political economy. The watershed events of this story are the abandonment of the gold standard and the emergence of the so-called 'warfare state' over the course of the Great War. As the first total war, it forced those fighting it to mobilize all their assets-not just military, but also organizational, financial, monetary and industrial. 23 Warfare states were set up to do this, putting the final nail in the coffin of the nineteenth-century night watchman's state. They promptly 'monetarized' the economy, in Joseph Schumpeter's phrase, seizing control of the money supply which had previously been determined by the strictures of the gold standard.
Controlled from the City of London, the gold standard had given Britain what Marxian international political economists term hegemony over the world economy. 24 Yet by the time Britain emerged victorious from the war, it had been reduced to a net debtor nation. Most of its foreign debt was held by New York banks, marking the emergence of that city as a major international financial centre for the first time. It is necessary to "redefine the problem," David Edgerton wrote in 1997, "of 'decline.'
For the British relative decline has been from a position of extraordinary relative strength (…)
The key to understanding it is explaining success and not failure, and in explaining decreasing relative success, rather than increasing relative failure." What is therefore needed is not an approach that starts from the transition's eventual outcome and searches for its roots far back in time, as declinists do. The new historiography of twentieth-century Britain indicates that instead, the Anglo-American transition was propelled by contingent events, driven by international interaction (and so by agency) on the short term. Such a process is best understood through a short chronology.
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The Short Chronology
The revisionists of Britain's decline do not directly address the issue of the Anglo-American transition, or the rising powers debate. Their primary concern is with the historiography of modern Britain, rather than that of Anglo-American relations, let alone US historiography.
Their challenge to the declinist historiography of Britain nonetheless implies that Washington eclipsed London over a far shorter period than we are used to thinking of-a few years rather than many decades. This is what I term the 'short chronology,' which I detail further in this section. I also critically re-examine a key text in the long chronology tradition, aiming to show how in actuality crucial arguments underpinning it support a short chronology. were much greater in the first half of the twentieth century than declinists have assumed. 46 Another strain of radical revisionism attacks the implicit nationalism in many declinist accounts. A central assumption behind declinism is that international power is home-grown;
hence, the national unit of the United Kingdom is compared to the much larger US, Soviet
Union and so on. However, as Edgerton argues, Britain's power and advances on the world stage derived to a great degree from its ability to draw on its empire and the world economic web, at the centre of which it sat. 47 The fact that British international power during this period should not be seen as a monolithic thing that was 'made in Britain' is further underlined by the World in Depression (1973) . As briefly noted above, Kindleberger's main conclusion was that the Great Depression was so severe and prolonged because there was no single dominant financial centre and currency that, backed by a strong state's monetary policy, could stabilise the world economy by preventing tit-for-tat protectionism and autarky drives. Britain and the pound sterling had been able to do this in the Victorian and Edwardian eras, but were unable to in the 1930s. 49 An economic historian, Kindleberger chose his period (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) deliberately and carefully limited his financial and monetary argument to questions of economic history.
His book, published during a later twentieth-century economic crisis, was highly influential.
Within IR, Robert Gilpin and others extrapolated from Kindleberger's argument to posit that a world without a single politically and economically dominant state is more prone to instability and war, an argument known as hegemonic stability theory. 50 However, they did not take into as the key period. The key events were the Depression and the Second World War, which appear as abrupt shocks to Britain and the US's positions, rather than codas of a longer process of decline. The short chronology stands the standard account on its head: Britain entered this short period as a remarkably strong power, yet by its end had been decisively overtaken by a US that had been comparatively weak. These rapid changes occurred not exogenously, like the macroeconomic shifts of the long chronology, but flowed from conscious political action, like the choice and ability to rearm. 52 This enables one to recover a sense of the options open and choices made by the people actually involved, and makes it difficult to take the transition's outcome for granted. Where the long chronology paints an image of the Anglo-American transition as a Cartesian x-graph, with a declining curve intersecting a rising one, the short chronology is best likened to the volatile ups and downs of a seismograph.
This presents a host of new questions. The first is implied by how differently the revisionists and Kindleberger appraise British power: if Britain was in fact strong during the interwar period, or even the only global power, then how was it so rapidly eclipsed? Any answer to this central question must also confront the radical revisionists' insistence that British power cannot be understood in national terms during this period, and that one must take the EmpireCommonwealth into account. Indeed the radicals' emphasis on London's ability to mobilize the world economy against its enemies through its control of the world seas implies that British power was in a sense transnational. This raises difficult questions about international power, war, and interdependence, which should interest any IR scholar and are highly relevant to the current rising powers debate. 
Conclusion: The Historiography of the Anti-Historiographers
There is much to gain from the dialogue between historical and theoretical approaches pursued in this essay. This is not a new argument. Recent years have seen a historical turn in IR, which insists that "history and social science are co-implicated" as scholarly endeavours. In that tradition, this essay pushes back against the idea that periodisation, and historiography in general, is something only "historians do or are supposed to be doing," to use the words of Anders Stephanson (a historian). Much work in the historical turn so far has been metatheoretical, aiming to break down the "eternal divide" between history and IR in the abstract. It has marketed the analytical and theoretical tools scholars can gain by marrying historical and social-scientific epistemologies, ontologies, and modes of analysis. This paper has taken a more concrete tack, showing how a quintessentially historical concern like periodisation is implicated in the explanations and theories even of non-historians. The same holds true for the rising powers and the future of world order today. Reacting to the concern generated by the rise of China especially, one side of the rising powers debate insists that power shifts do not necessarily lead to conflict, let alone a crisis in world order.
Some even reject power transition theory wholesale. As alluded to above, others have pursued a small but fruitful avenue of research into the phenomenon of peaceful power transitions. at root, and built at a moment of high wartime crisis, then Ikenberry's argument that we need not worry about US decline today is strengthened.
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A short-chronological approach to the empire debate may also lead to advances. For instance, in earlier work Go has argued that the manner of the United States' rise was conditioned by the shape of the contemporaneous "global field." The United States could rely on "European imperial networks rather than constructing a formal empire of its own," working through rather than against them to secure its interests. Go's global field theory seems especially applicable to Darwin's idea of the British world-system. It is clear that British power flowed from this system, yet from Cold War alliances like the Australia-New Zealand-US (ANZUS)
Treaty we know parts of it reoriented themselves toward the US. One is tempted to draw the analogy with current times. To what extent does US power rely on a 'world-system' of its own?
How do rising powers relate to it? And is it possible, even necessary, for a would-be challenger to co-opt such a system? Theory and historiography can go hand in hand to achieve analytical grip on such empirical questions. 61 The historical perspective taken here can significantly contribute to the debate on today's rising powers. There is, of course, the old historians' caveat that there are no straightforward lessons to be drawn from history. Yet even with that in mind, the AngloAmerican example has some important implications for the way we talk about any mooted shift today. Much of the debate is pitched in grand-historical terms, as the epochal end of an era, whether something as short as the American half-century or as huge as the past two centuries of Western dominance. Yet it is clear from the above that the major transition of the past century was a short-term affair that took place over a few short years in the 1940s. None foresaw that moment or the manner in which the United States overtook Britain. The way events played out was not driven by structure or great historical forces but by the contingent choices of politicians and bureaucrats, diplomats and generals, and -not to forget -anti-colonial nationalists.
Diplomacy and politics, whether public or bureaucratic, determined the course of the transition. Consequently these should be the foci of the current rising powers debate, not systems or structures. We should keep firmly in mind that the situation can change radically and unpredictably in a brief timespan. None in the rising powers debate of the 1980s could foresee the end of the Cold War, the stagnation of Japan, or the US leap into unipolarity. David
Armitage and Jo Guldi have recently claimed that history can only achieve relevance in the public sphere by orienting itself on the longue durée. Yet as this essay has shown, the opposite is true here. It is the short term that should occupy our minds if we want to understand the rise of the new powers. 
